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Abstract 
We investigate the separate and joint influences of social engagement measures on 
stock market participation and find that socially engaged individuals are more likely 
to participate. Consistent with Granovetter’s (1973) theory of social networks we find 
that a weak tie (measured by social group involvement) has a positive effect on stock 
market participation whereas a strong tie (measured by frequency of talking to 
neighbours) has no effect. More trusting individuals are more likely to participate in 
the stock market, as are those who identify with a political party. In contrast, the 
degree to which religion is important appears to have little impact.  
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1. Introduction  
Most households underinvest in stocks despite the long-term risk premium and 
diversification gains that are available (Mehra and Prescott, 1985). Limited stock 
market participation has persisted in spite of the growth of stocks held indirectly 
through vehicles such as mutual funds (Mankiw and Zeldes, 1991; Haliassos and 
Bertaut, 1995) and it afflicts European as well as US households, albeit to a lesser 
extent (Guiso et al., 2002). Low stock market participation is evident in our study and 
the puzzle of persistent low participation is especially concerning at a time when 
individuals bear more responsibility for investing their money (Campbell et al., 2011).  
We assess the extent to which the variety and intensity of an individual’s social 
engagement affects stock market participation. Access to information on how to start 
investing in the stock market and how to manage a portfolio reduces the fixed costs 
of stock market participation. Guiso and Japelli (2005) find that greater awareness of 
stocks, mutual funds and investment accounts is positively correlated with social 
interaction, while Ivković and Weisbenner (2007) find evidence that local information 
diffusion leads to common portfolio choices among neighbouring households. 
Socially engaged households have more opportunities to learn about investment 
opportunities from peers who are already informed. Over time, social engagement 
generates a stock of capital, generally referred to as social capital, which reduces 
information cost barriers to stock market participation. Prior literature suggests that 
social engagement measures are important determinants of stock market 
participation (e.g. Hong et al., 2004; Georgarakos and Pasini, 2011; Kaustia and 
Torstila, 2011). However, most studies investigate these factors in isolation. 
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Our study makes four important contributions to the literature. First, we examine 
information diffusion through two channels of social interaction: frequency of talking 
to neighbours and involvement in social groups. Although regarded as distinct 
channels in social interaction theory (Granovetter, 1973) empirical studies assume 
that they capture the same information (e.g. Hong et al., 2004; Georgarakos and 
Pasini, 2011). Second, most studies investigate social engagement measures such 
as trust and religiosity and social group involvement in isolation whereas we bring 
them together in one model to determine their independent effects. We add to the 
findings of Georgarakos and Pasini (2011) who combine trust and social group 
involvement by bringing in religiosity and political identity. Third, we use an 
integrated measure of political party identification based upon responses to four 
questions to examine the role of political identity and shifts in political party 
preferences. Apart from Kaustia and Torstila (2011) and Bonaparte and Kumar 
(2013) political party identification has not been examined in the context of stock 
market participation. We extend their analyses by including political identity and 
shifts in political party preferences, along with other social engagement measures, 
within the same model. Finally, motivated by the findings in Ai and Norton (2003) and 
Williams (2012), we interpret our results using marginal effects to show the separate 
and joint influences of social engagement.  
A major factor limiting research on the determinants of stock market participation 
is a dearth of detailed data (Hong et al., 2004; Georgarakos and Pasini, 2011; 
Kaustia and Torstila, 2011). We take advantage of data on both individual 
characteristics and stock market participation available in the British Household 
Panel Survey (BHPS) across a diverse range of age groups. We use individual level 
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data rather than household level data as most of the social engagement variables in 
the BHPS are derived from individual observations.  
Our findings show that both the variety and the intensity of social interaction 
influence stock market participation. Based on social network theory we measure 
strong ties using the binary variable talking to neighbours and weak ties using both a 
binary variable active in social groups and a categorical variable number of social 
groups. When our set of social engagement measures are analysed in separate 
equations, all apart from strong ties have significant effects on stock market 
participation in contrast to the findings of Hong et al. (2004). We conclude that strong 
ties and weak ties are distinct channels of social interaction. Further, we find that 
religion has little effect, contrary to the findings of Renneboog and Spaenjers (2012). 
Our results also indicate that political identity has a separate positive influence on 
stock market participation. In a specification that includes these variables in one 
equation, we find that in addition to the independent effects of social group 
involvement and trust reported in Georgarakos and Pasini (2011) identification with 
both the Conservative and Liberal Democratic parties have positive effects while 
religion has a negative effect. 1  Our results thus indicate that social group 
involvement, trust, religion and political identity are distinct social engagement 
measures with independent effects on stock market participation. When we interact 
these variables, we find that social group involvement and trust compensate for 
political identity. Further, individuals who have recently identified with the 
Conservative and Liberal Democratic parties are less likely to participate in the stock 
                                                          
1
 When social group involvement is a binary variable, as in prior studies, we find that the variable “religion 
makes a difference” has a negative and significant effect. When we use our, arguably more robust, categorical 
measure of social group involvement, “number of social groups”, religion ceases to be significant. 
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market than those who identified with the same party throughout our study, thus 
indicating a differential effect for consumer voters relative to ideological supporters. 
The net effect of our social engagement measures is that the probability of stock 
market participation increases by approximately one fifth for fully engaged individuals 
compared to those who either do not socially engage or who have few avenues of 
social engagement.  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the empirical 
literature and identifies our social engagement measures. In section 3, we discuss 
the structure and features of the data, describe the variables and present the 
descriptive statistics and the research approach. Section 4 presents the empirical 
results. Finally, we conclude and discuss the implications of the study in section 5. 
2. Prior literature 
2.1 Social engagement, social capital and stock market participation 
As individuals interact more with others and become more socially engaged there is 
reason to believe they will be more inclined to participate in the stock market. For 
example, those who talk more to their neighbours are more likely to find out about 
the stock market, as are those who are more involved in social groups. Individuals 
who are more trusting are more likely to take information they receive about stock 
market investing at face value and thus be more inclined to participate. Those for 
whom religious beliefs make more of a difference to their lives are more likely to be 
socially active in church activities and therefore to be more exposed to the possibility 
of stock market investing - though their views about the stock market may also be 
coloured by their interpretation of their religion’s perspective on investing. Finally, 
those who identify themselves with a political party are more likely to encounter 
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information about stock market investing through related social activities and stock 
market participation is likely to be greater if their political beliefs accord with the view 
that market forces benefit society. In sum, social engagement mechanisms help to 
reduce information cost barriers that inhibit individuals from participating in the stock 
market. 
Typically, the literature refers not to social engagement but to social capital, 
which we argue is simply the stock of capital built up over time by the process of 
social engagement. There is growing evidence that accumulated social capital 
influences financial well-being. Though there is no consensus on the definition of 
social capital, much research has been motivated by Putnam (1993) who defines 
social capital as a combination of trust, norms and networks. These become 
embedded in individual and group social interactions, enhancing personal and 
common goals in society (Narayan and Pritchett, 1997; Harper and Kelly, 2003). 
While there is no general agreement regarding the best social capital metrics, the 
Social Capital Index composed by Putnam (2000, p. 291) identifies five broad 
components: (1) community organizational life; (2) engagement in public affairs; (3) 
community voluntarism; (4) informal sociability; and (5) social trust.2 The first four of 
these components reflect different aspects of social interaction, some of which are 
fostered by adherence to religious beliefs, while trust arises from the process of 
repeated social interaction (Putnam, 1995). These dimensions of accumulated social 
capital - social interaction, trust, and religion – are used in prior studies of stock 
market participation.  
                                                          
2
 Alternative measures of social capital have been suggested. For example, Woolcock (1998) proposes four 
dimensions: communitarian, network, institutional and synergy. 
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Some have argued that Putnam’s Social Capital Index overly simplifies the 
different dimensions of social capital. For example, Bjørnskov (2006) suggests 
investigating the different dimensions individually. In our study we investigate five 
forms of social engagement: Talking to neighbours (informal sociability); both 
membership of Social Groups and Religion (community organisational life); Political 
Party Affiliation (engagement in public affairs) and; Trust (social trust). 
2.2 Social interaction – weak ties and strong ties 
In line with Granovetter’s theory of social networks, investigations of the role of social 
interaction typically identify two channels of information diffusion: weak ties, i.e. ties 
with formal and informal organisations, and strong ties, i.e. ties with family, 
neighbours and close associates (Granovetter, 1973; 1983; 2005). Studies that use 
proxies for strong ties show that knowing and visiting neighbours (Hong et al., 2004), 
the likelihood of sharing consumption and investing information with neighbours 
(Ivković and Weisbenner, 2007; Brown et al., 2008) and living in regions with high 
participation rates in elections, voting, and blood donation (Guiso et al., 2004) 
increases the probability of stock market participation. Similarly, weak ties such as 
involvement in social groups is positively associated with stock market participation 
(Georgarakos and Pasini, 2011; Brown et al., 2008; Christelis et al., 2010). Although 
these studies suggest a priori an association between the two channels of 
information diffusion and stock market participation, Granovetter (1983) argues that 
weak ties provide productive information and new ideas, which we conjecture are 
more relevant for stock market participation. In other words, social interaction 
through both weak ties and strong ties provide avenues for the transmission of 
costless information about the stock market through word-of-mouth or observational 
learning (Banerjee, 1992). Individuals can derive satisfaction from discussing market 
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trends and patterns with friends (Becker, 1991) and talking to family members, 
neighbours, colleagues and friends about investing (Nofsinger, 2005). However, 
weak ties play the role of ‘transmitting unique and non-redundant information across 
otherwise largely disconnected segments of social networks’ compared to strong ties 
(Granovetter, 2005). This suggests that effective transmission of financial information 
regarding investment opportunities, performance and trends potentially occurs 
through weak ties.  
In this study, we underscore the distinction between the two channels of 
information diffusion.  The hypotheses to be tested are: 
Hypothesis 1: Individuals who talk more frequently with their neighbours are more 
likely to participate in the stock market.  
Hypothesis 2: Individuals who are active in social groups are more likely to 
participate in the stock market.  
2.3 Trust and stock market participation 
In the context of this study trust is the degree to which an individual believes that 
associates or institutions are likely to fulfil their part of a formal or informal 
contractual agreement (Guiso et al. 2008). For individuals to participate in the stock 
market they must trust the entire financial system, including the investment process 
and the actors involved. In a study using a variety of individual and generalised trust 
measures across countries, Guiso et al. (2008) find that trust has a positive and 
statistically significant effect upon direct share ownership, the percentage of risky 
assets owned, the average rate of stock market participation, and the proportion of 
wealth invested in stocks (Guiso et al., 2004). However, the use of the ‘level of trust’ 
as a measure of social capital is debateable as it may be linked with other factors 
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such as religiosity or sociability, making causality hard to determine (Guiso et al., 
2004).  
In a recent study, Georgarakos and Pasini (2011) include trust and sociability 
measures in one model and find that both have independent effects on stock market 
participation. They also find that where trust levels are low, sociability may 
compensate. El-Attar and Poschke (2011) show that households with low trust levels 
tend to invest in housing rather than risky financial assets. Investigating the role of 
religion on household finance, Renneboog and Spaenjers (2012) also find a positive 
association between religiosity and trust. In a related study, Hong et al. (2004) use 
church attendance as a proxy for sociability, suggesting that both religious beliefs 
and social interaction are related. These findings underscore the links between trust, 
religion, and sociability. In this study, we further test the influence of trust on stock 
market participation while controlling for other social engagement measures. The 
hypothesis to be tested is: 
Hypothesis 3: Individuals who are more trusting are more likely to participate in the 
stock market.  
2.4 Religion and stock market participation 
Religion can affect the stock market participation decision as a direct result of 
theological beliefs or indirectly through its effect on factors such as trust and social 
interaction.  The importance of thrift - being careful with money - is a common 
feature of religious doctrines (Keister, 2003). The long-term outperformance of 
stocks compared to other asset classes might therefore be expected to encourage 
stock market participation among those who have a religious affiliation.  Guiso et al. 
(2003) find that religiosity is associated with a greater emphasis on the importance of 
thrift across countries, and also with a greater sense of individual responsibility.  The 
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latter may also incline households to invest in the stock market, given the higher 
rewards available from stocks in the longer term. Religious households are more 
likely to leave bequests and therefore to consider longer term planning horizons, 
which favours stock market participation (Renneboog and Spaenjers, 2012).  
Guiso et al. (2003) find that religion has a positive effect on trust towards 
others, mainly through regular attendance at religious services. They also find that it 
is positively associated with attitudes that are conducive to free markets. Therefore, 
religion may increase the likelihood of investing in stocks by raising both 
interpersonal trust and trust in market mechanisms.  Attendance at religious services 
is also likely to increase social networking, which could positively affect stock market 
participation through increased opportunities for learning about investment choices; 
Hong et al. (2004) use a general religiosity measure, “attend church”, to proxy for 
social interaction and find it to be positively associated with stock market 
participation.  
Evidence on the role of religion on financial outcomes is mixed and its effect 
varies across countries. Using Dutch survey data, Renneboog and Spaenjers (2012) 
find Catholics to be more risk averse compared to Protestants and those of other 
religious beliefs and that they are less likely to participate in the stock market. 
However, the level of significance varies considerably depending on the controls 
used and the findings are not significant when they bring together all variables in one 
model. Using church membership and attendance data for a demographically 
representative sample of the Dutch population, Noussair et al. (2012) report that 
more religious people are more risk averse but their result is driven more by social 
aspects of church membership than by the religious beliefs themselves.  León and 
Pfeifer (2013) use German survey data and also find religiously affiliated people to 
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be more risk-averse, but they go a step further and consider a context-specific risk 
attitude, namely financial risk-taking. They discover that Christians are more willing 
to take financial risks compared to non-religious individuals and that they are more 
likely to hold risky assets such as stocks. This is consistent with the finding of Halek 
and Eisenhauer (2001) that Catholics and Jews, although more averse to pure risk, 
are more tolerant of speculative risk taking.  
The lack of consistency in findings across countries and studies about the 
impact of religion may be due to other characteristics of those holding religious 
beliefs, including alternative aspects of social capital, as alluded to by Gruber (2005). 
We test the influence of religion using a general question regarding whether 
respondents think religion makes a difference in their lives. In line with the direct and 
indirect arguments suggesting a positive influence of religion on stock market 
participation, the hypothesis to be tested is:  
Hypothesis 4: Religion is positively associated with stock market participation. 
2.5 Political party identification and stock market participation 
Existing evidence suggests that political preferences are associated with socio-
economic outcomes and more specifically with the portfolio decisions of investors.  In 
a Finnish study, Kaustia and Torstila (2011) find that both individual voters and 
members of parliament who have a more left-wing outlook are less likely to 
participate in the stock market.  They attribute this to “value expressive” 
considerations, namely the idea that personal values dictate decisions. Negative 
perceptions about the stock market, for example that it is a source of greed or 
speculation or unethical behaviour, may make individuals less inclined to participate, 
even in the face of evidence that the stock market outperforms alternative asset 
classes.  This feeling of discomfort when simultaneously holding two or more 
11 
 
conflicting ideas is known as “cognitive dissonance” (Festinger, 1957). This can be 
regarded as an additional participation cost and some investors may stay out of the 
stock market to avoid it.  Along similar lines, Hong and Kostovetsky (2012) find that 
political preferences influence the asset allocation decisions of relatively 
sophisticated US investors: mutual and hedge fund managers who donate to the 
Democratic Party underweight socially contentious firms, with the reverse pattern 
evident for fund managers who donate to the Republican Party. 
The expressions of political preferences in elections are determined, at least in 
part, on the ideological positions of political parties (Sanders, 1999). However, this 
factor has declined in importance with voters placing more weight on the 
competitiveness of party policies (Clarke et al., 2004). In the UK, evidence suggest 
that elections are generally determined by two competing sets of influences: 
‘consumer voting’ based on evaluations of political party competence (Clarke et al., 
2004; Green and Hobolt, 2008) and political party identification based upon 
ideological differences, albeit against a background of ideological convergence 
(Sanders, 2003). Despite the evidence that consumer voting has increased in the 
UK, Sanders (2003) argues that party identification is still an important consideration.  
We might therefore expect some potential investors with left-wing political leanings to 
stay out of the stock market to avoid the participation cost associated with cognitive 
dissonance. 
Irrespective of political preferences, interest in politics may have a positive 
impact on stock market participation. Using US and European data, Bonaparte and 
Kumar (2013) find that politically active individuals, defined as those who say that 
they vote more often, are more likely to participate in the stock market. Bonaparte 
and Kumar attribute this to such individuals following political news more actively, 
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thereby increasing their chance of being exposed to financial news. This lowers their 
information gathering costs and thus increases stock market participation. We 
investigate the relationship between political party identification and stock market 
participation, and analyse how the relationship varies by political party allegiance 
and the impact of shifts in this allegiance over time. Based on the idea that 
information-gathering costs are lower for those who identify with a political party, the 
hypothesis that we test is: 
Hypothesis 5: Individuals who identify with political parties are more likely to 
participate in the stock market.   
3. Data 
3.1 Description and construction of the variables 
This study uses data from the BHPS that provides annual individual and household 
information about social and economic variables. The original sample of the BHPS 
was approximately 5,500 households consisting of 14,000 individuals from across 
the UK, subsequently increased by additional samples from Scotland and Northern 
Ireland3. The BHPS has three features that are relevant to this study. First, and most 
important, it provides data on both social engagement measures and stock market 
participation at the individual level. Second, it facilitates analysis of the impact of 
generational and age effects. This is important because levels of social engagement 
- the number of  social groups, participation during elections, the frequency of  
reading newspapers, and social trust - have been found to be non-linear functions of 
age; they increase towards middle age, remain constant during middle age, and 
                                                          
3
The BHPS consists of 18 waves to 2008. Since 2010 (Wave 19), the BHPS has been replaced by, and 
incorporated into, the United Kingdom Household Longitudinal Study (UKHLS).   
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decline as individuals advance in age (Putnam, 1995). Further, it is arguable that 
social engagement is attributable to generational effects, so that belonging to a 
specific cohort is associated with increased/decreased levels of social engagement 
(Putnam, 1995). Most studies are restricted to specific cohorts (e.g. Hong et al., 
2004; Bogan, 2008), limiting the extent to which inferences can be made about the 
general population. Therefore, we use BHPS cohorts and ages ranging from 1900 to 
1979 and 19 to 98 respectively. Third, by its structure the BHPS minimises the 
problem of sample attrition - respondents who participate in a few waves or 
completely drop out of the sample - by a process of re-weighting the cases who gave 
full interviews at all waves (for a detailed explanation, see Taylor (2010)).  
Our use of the BHPS is limited to the years 1995, 2000 and 2005 because, to 
date, these are the only years in which investment questions were asked. For 
variables not observed during these three waves, we impute responses using the 
observations in either succeeding or preceding waves4 and thus we assume that 
these imputed social engagement measures and controls do not vary in a manner 
that will materially affect our results.  
Table I shows how each variable is constructed. In the survey, individuals are 
first asked whether they have money in investments and, if they answer ‘yes’, they 
select the financial instruments in which the money is invested – national savings 
certificates, premium bonds, unit trusts, personal equity plans, shares (UK or 
foreign), national savings / building society, insurance bonds and other investments. 
                                                          
4
 Access to the Internet from home – wave 6 and 10 onwards; social interaction – wave 7 onwards; social 
group membership – skipped annually after wave 2; religion – wave 1, 7, 9, 11, 14 and 18; trust – wave 8, 10, 
13, 15 and 17; and life events – waves 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, 11 and 14.  
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We define the dependent variable, stock market participation 1 (SMP1), as a dummy 
variable taking the value one if the individual holds either unit trusts or shares. This 
definition provides the minimum degree of stock market participation because 
individuals may also invest indirectly through retirement plans and other financial 
instruments that include stocks. An alternative dependent variable (SMP2) includes 
investments in PEPs, Tessas and ISAs and, along with two further alternatives, 
investment in fixed interest assets and the number of investment products, described 
in Table I, are used for robustness checks, which confirm our key results. 
Insert Table I Somewhere Here 
  We generate five social engagement variables. Of these, two represent 
strong and weak ties. The proxy for strong ties is the frequency of talking to 
neighbours and takes the value one if a respondent talks to neighbours “everyday”, 
“once in a week” or “once in a month” (92.8%) and the value zero if “rarely”  or 
“never” (7.2%).5 The proxy for weak ties is based on social group activity. We define 
the variable active in social groups as a dummy variable that takes the value one if a 
member is active and the value zero otherwise. We also use four dummy variables 
derived from the number of organisations 6  respondents are members of as an 
alternative proxy for weak ties. To control for neighbourhood effects, which may 
                                                          
5
 Alternative definitions of the talking to neighbours variable are also generated using different (0, 1) 
combinations of the five categories defined in Table I. Comparable results obtained for these other definitions 
are available from the authors. 
6
 The organisations listed include political party, trade union, environmental group, parents association, 
tenants or residents group, religious group, voluntary service group, other community group, social group, 
sports club, women’s institute, women’s group, other organisation, professional organisation, pensioners 
organisation and scout/guides organisation. 
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contaminate these variables, we include two dummy variables. The first is the 
variable good neighbourhood, which takes the value one if a respondent thinks that 
her/his neighbourhood is a “good” place to live in and the value zero if the response 
is “moderate” or “bad”. The second is the variable concentrated housing, which takes 
the value one if the type of accommodation is “detached”, “semi-detached”, or 
“terraced” and the value zero if it is a “converted flat”, “purpose built flat” or any other 
type of housing.   
Trust is a binary variable taking a value of one for positive responses to the 
question: “generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that 
you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?” Religiosity is measured by the 
dummy variable religion makes a difference. This takes a value one if respondents 
answer: a little difference, some difference or a great difference to the question: “how 
much difference would you say religious beliefs make to your life?”  It takes the value 
zero if the answer is no difference.  
Political party identification is derived using answers to four questions about 
interest in politics. First, all respondents are asked whether they support a particular 
political party to which the response is either ‘yes’ or ‘no’. Second, If the response is 
‘no’, the respondent is asked whether she/he is ‘closer to one political party than 
another’. Third, respondents who do not support or feel closer to one political party 
than another are asked to identify the political party they would vote for tomorrow.  
Finally, respondents who support a particular political party or feel closer to one 
political party than another are asked to identify the particular political party. By 
combining responses to these questions, a respondent is classified as having no 
political inclination if she/he does not support any political party; is not closer to one 
political party than another; or does not identify a political party he/she would vote for 
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tomorrow. Otherwise, respondents are categorised as belonging to the Conservative 
Party, the Labour Party, the Liberal Democratic Party, or other parties7 based on the 
party they would vote for tomorrow or that they identified in the last question. The 
variable therefore captures both political ideology and consumer voting. We generate 
five dummy variables for each category. Finally, we use a comprehensive set of 
socio-economic and demographic control variables, described in Table I.   
Our proxy for the control variable Financial Capability uses the responses to 
seven BHPS questions about financial management, as reported in Table I. It is 
similar to the approach of Hilgert et al. (2003) and Atkinson et al. (2007) and follows 
the method used by Taylor et al. (2009) in their construction of a financial incapability 
index. However, we invert our index so that positive values represent financial 
capability8.  
3.2 Descriptive Statistics 
 Table II presents weighted summary statistics for the whole sample. The most 
popular investment vehicles among individuals in our sample are savings accounts 
(63%), premium bonds (22%) and ISAs (20%), and direct shareholding (18%). SMP1 
and SMP2 respectively represent 21% and 35% of money invested, while the 
proportion of those who invest in less risky assets is 28%. The figures for the type of 
investment do not add up to 100% since individuals may hold more than one 
                                                          
7
 The “other parties” category includes regional parties such as the Scottish National party, Plaid Cymru and 
other smaller parties. 
8
 The response categories to the questions were recoded to remove missing values and standardized (to have 
a mean zero and a variance of one). The constructed index has a 0.7036 Cronbach’s alpha with a 0.2532 
average inter-item correlation. These values provide a satisfactory level of internal consistency (for a detailed 
discussion see Taylor et al., 2009).  The higher the index value the higher the financial capability. 
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instrument. On average, 92.8% of the respondents acknowledge that they talk to 
their neighbours. The other social engagement measures have lower averages but 
their standard deviations indicate a higher variation relative to the mean than the 
talking to neighbours variable. The financial capability index takes negative and 
positive values, with increasingly negative values representing declining financial 
capability and increasingly positive values representing improving financial 
capability. The mean of zero implies that on average respondents are financially 
capable. 
Insert Table II here 
  The measures of social engagement – talking to neighbours, active in social 
groups, trusts most people, and religion makes a difference – have moderate 
correlations ranging from -0.031 to 0.1159. Surprisingly, the variable religion makes a 
difference is negatively correlated with other proxies for social engagement 
suggesting that religious people are less likely to talk to their neighbours frequently, 
to get involved in social groups, and to trust most people. Having no party affiliation 
and being affiliated with other smaller parties are negatively correlated with talking to 
neighbours, active in social groups and trusts most people, whereas affiliation to the 
Liberal Democratic Party and the Conservative Party are both positively correlated 
with these variables. Generally, the correlations are low between most of the control 
variables and the variables of interest. Therefore, we expect each variable to provide 
independent information in relation to stock market participation.    
                                                          
9
 Correlation coefficients for all of the variables are available from the authors. 
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3.3 Econometric model 
From the summary statistics reported in Table II, we observe variations in the key 
independent variables. Further, respondents do not substantially change their stock 
market participation status from one period to the other 10  and, across all the 
independent variables, the between variations are about double the within variations. 
This implies that if we were to use a fixed effects model, individuals who do not 
change participation status over the panel period will not contribute to the estimation, 
making the identification harder. This suggests that a pooled probit model is more 
appropriate for our data. We cluster standard errors at the individual level. We 
therefore estimate the general static binary response model given by: 
 
   
                         ,  
      
             
                        .  (1) 
 
where    
  is a latent variable,     is the dummy for observed stock market 
participation,     are the time varying explanatory variables,    are the time invariant 
control variables,    is an error term, and      a transitory error term.  
First, we investigate whether strong and weak ties are distinct measures of 
social interaction. As discussed in section 2, our proposition is that weak ties provide 
sources of new information. This has three implications: (1) non-participants are 
more likely to participate in the stock market upon joining a social group; (2) the 
more social groups an individual is involved with, the higher the effects on 
                                                          
10
 For example, among respondents who were out of the stock market in one period, 88% remained out of the 
market in the next period compared to 57% for those who participated in the market. 
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participation; and (3) most important, in an equation that includes both channels, 
measures of strong ties should have insignificant effects. We estimate the following 
equations: 
        
                         , (2) 
 
 
       
                                    
                          
(3) 
 
Where       is a dummy for stock market participation for individual i in year t. The 
social interaction (SI) variable of interest in eq. (2) is either talking to neighbours 
(TTN) or active in social group (ASG) and both variables are combined in eq. (3). 
The control variables (CV) are housing tenure, financial capability index, has no 
debt, received windfall income, computer user, cohorts, good health, male, age, 
married, has child(ren), highest qualification, economic activity, government office 
region and income quintiles. The error term     represents unobserved individual 
effects.  
Second, we investigate whether each of the social engagement measures 
have independent effects on stock market participation. We should expect to see 
significant effects if each social engagement measure is analysed in isolation, as in: 
       
                                (4) 
The social engagement measures (SEM) include the social interaction 
variables in eq. (3), trusts most people (TMP), and religion makes a difference 
(RMD). However, we contend that the measures may capture the same underlying 
information or affect the control variables, so we expect to see increased, diminished 
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or insignificant effects in the equation that brings social engagement measures 
together, as in:  
        
                                                    . (5) 
The variables are estimated in isolation in eq. (4) and are combined in eq. (5).  
Third, we examine the role of political party identification. Two implications 
emerge from the literature: (1) if party identification matters, those who identify with 
right-wing parties are more likely to participate in the stock market; (2) otherwise, if 
policies are very similar and evaluation of political party competence is more 
important, party identification should have less influence on participation. The model 
is represented by: 
        
                          . (6) 
Where the dependent and control variables are as described in equations 1 – 4 and 
the additional variable of interest is party identification (PI).  
Finally, we pool all of these factors to estimate the determinants of stock 
market participation. Again, we contend that there may be correlations between 
social engagement measures and party identification, or with other variables such as 
housing (El-Attar and Poschke, 2011). The model is represented by: 
        
                                     . (7) 
The dependent variable and explanatory variables are as defined in equations 1 - 6.  
4. Empirical results 
Each of our results tables reports the effects of our independent variables on stock 
market participation separately and jointly. The results of the separate estimations 
broadly follow those for prior studies discussed in the literature review. In contrast, 
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when all of the variables are brought together in a general specification the results 
provide the main contribution of our study by showing which independent variable 
associations remain significant. When the social engagement variables are 
combined together sequentially the results suggest that more socially engaged 
respondents are more likely to participate in the stock market. 
4.1 The role of social interaction, trust and religion  
Table III presents the marginal effects from unbalanced pooled probit estimates 
using seven specifications. Panel A shows the marginal effects at means (MEMs) 
while Panels B and C present the marginal effects at representative values (MERs). 
We calculate the joint effects of our social engagement measures in Panel D. In all 
the specifications we control for good neighbourhood, concentrated housing, housing 
tenure, received windfall income, has no debt, financial capability, computer use, 
good health, male, age, age square, cohort, married, has child(ren), highest 
qualification, economic activity, government office region and income, as defined in 
Table I.  
Insert Table III Somewhere here 
Table III, Panel A, reports MEMs for each of the social engagement 
measures, first separately and then together. In column 1, the variable of interest is 
talking to neighbours as used by Hong et al. (2004). In the second specification, 
column 2, we test the separate influence of the variable active in social groups as 
used by Georgarakos and Pasini (2011). In contrast to the findings of Hong et al. 
(2004) and hypothesis 1, when MEMs are estimated in isolation we do not find a 
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correlation between talking to neighbours and stock market participation. 11  
Consistent with the prior literature and hypothesis 2, we find that when MEMs are 
estimated in isolation, individuals who are active in social groups appear more likely 
to participate in the stock market. Similarly, column 3 indicates that trusting 
individuals are more likely to participate in the stock market (in line with hypothesis 
3), while those who say that religion makes a difference in their lives, column 4, are 
less likely to participate (contrary to hypothesis 4). Control variables have the 
expected signs, are significant at the 1% level, and are stable across the four 
specifications.    
In column (5) we use a single regression that includes both talking to 
neighbours and active in social groups. The effects remain insignificant for talking to 
neighbours but significant for active in social groups. When we combine all the social 
engagement measures in one regression, column (6), the variables active in social 
groups, trusts most people, and religion makes a difference have independent 
positive effects on stock market participation, but religion has a negative effect and 
talking to neighbours remains insignificant. This result suggests that the marginal 
utility of information provided by strong ties remains insignificant in the presence of 
other social engagement variables.  
In column (7), we replace the binary social group dummy with a categorical 
variable representing the number of social groups with which an individual is 
involved. The idea is that involvement in many social groups exposes an individual to 
                                                          
11
 When we run this regression and exclude the variables good neighbourhood, concentrated housing, housing 
tenure, received windfall income, computer use, has no debt, financial capability and cohort, the variable 
talking to neighbours becomes significant at the 5% level. 
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a variety of sources that enhance the chances of encountering financial market 
information. The results indicate that individuals who are involved in three or more 
social groups are more likely to participate in the stock market than those involved in 
only one group.   
Given that MEMs do not represent actual individual characteristics, these 
interpretations may be incorrect (Ai and Norton, 2003; Williams, 2012; Bartus, 2005). 
Therefore, we also use MERs to interpret our results in Panels B, C, and D. Panel B 
shows MERs calculated using base characteristics for all variables, apart from the 
social engagement variable of interest, in each specification. Base characteristics 
represent an individual who: does not talk to neighbours; is not active in social 
groups; can’t be too careful – does not trust others; believes that religion makes little 
or no difference in life; and has no political identification; rents current 
accommodation; has not received windfall income; has debt; has a financial 
capability index value equal to the mean; is not a computer user; has bad health; is a 
female; is not married; does not have children; has no educational qualification; is 
unemployed; lives in the North East of England; and is categorised in the 1st income 
quintile. For example, in specification (1) we examine the marginal effect of talking to 
neighbours holding both the other social engagement measures and the control 
variables at their base levels. The results in panel B are consistent with those of 
panel A in that the effects for active in social groups, trusts most people and religion 
makes a difference are significant at the 1% level in specifications (2) to (4) 
respectively and at varying levels of significance when estimated in the combinations 
shown by specifications (5) through (7). Conversely, unlike base characteristics, 
varied characteristics take the maximum values of each variable, apart from region, 
which becomes East of England. Therefore, in Panel C, we consider an individual 
24 
 
with varied characteristics and we replicate the marginal effects calculated in Panel 
B and find consistent results. Comparing the MERs in Panels B and C, we clearly 
see that social engagement can distinguish stock market participants from non-
participants and that the measures have independent effects on stock market 
participation, thus confirming the results of our analysis using MEMS.  
In Panel D we cumulatively add the effects of the social engagement 
measures in specifications (5), (6) and (7). The marginal effects reported show the 
increasing/(decreasing) joint marginal effect on stock market participation as each 
social engagement measure is included in the calculation, keeping the remaining 
measures at their base levels. The reference person for our calculation of joint 
marginal effects exhibits the varied characteristics previously described for Panel C 
above and, in addition, cumulatively adds the four social engagement measures, 
beginning with talking to neighbours. For example, in specification (5) row (1), we 
first evaluate the effect of talking to neighbours and then evaluate the marginal 
effects of both talking to neighbours and active in social groups in row (2), holding 
the other social engagement measures at their base levels and using the reference 
person characteristics. Consistent with the previous results, talking to neighbours 
has an insignificant effect in all the specifications. When we consider a reference 
person that talks to neighbours and is active in social groups, row (2), the marginal 
effects on stock market participation are 3.23% and 2.67% in specifications (5) and 
(6) respectively. In specification (6), if he or she also trusts most people, the effects 
increase to 5.1%, but reduce to 3.9% if he or she also believes that religion makes a 
difference.  Similarly, in specification (7), we see that the incremental marginal effect 
of talking to neighbours and involvement in three or more social groups is 8.2%; and 
that the incremental marginal effect of talking to neighbours, involvement in three or 
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more social groups and trusting most people, is 11.0%, but falls back to 9.8% if 
religion makes a difference. The results in Panel D suggest that intensity of social 
engagement generally increases the likelihood of stock market participation.                                       
4.2  The role of political party identification  
In this section, we extend the analysis to include political party identification and 
report both MEMs (Panel A) and MERs (Panels B, C, and D) in Table IV. In 
specification (1) we regress stock market participation against political party 
identification together with the standard controls and we include the other social 
engagement measures in specification (2) and the categorical variable number of 
social groups in specification (3). 
Panel A of Table IV, column (1) presents the estimates for the association 
between stock market participation and political party identification in isolation. The 
results show that individuals who identify themselves with a mainstream political 
party are more likely to participate in the stock market as compared to those who do 
not have a political affiliation, consistent with hypothesis 5. However, some party 
affiliations have a greater effect. For example, the effect of identification with the 
Conservative Party is about one and half times larger than that of Liberal Democratic 
Party identification and six times that of Labour Party identification.  
Insert Table IV Somewhere here 
In column (2), we combine other social engagement measures and party 
identification in a single equation. The results show that social group involvement, 
trust, religion, and identification with the Liberal Democratic Party and the 
Conservative Party have independent effects on stock market participation. The 
variables talking to neighbours and identification with the Labour Party are 
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insignificant. Comparing these results with those in Table III, column (6), the effects 
are comparable for the variables active in social groups and religion makes a 
difference, suggesting a minimal correlation with party identification. When we use 
the number of social groups, column (3), in place of the social groups dummy 
variable, the effects of trusts most people,  identification with the Liberal Democratic 
party and identification with the Conservative Party remain significant. The variable 
religion makes a difference now becomes insignificant. The results for the variable 
number of social groups remains virtually unchanged from the results reported in 
Table III. 
 In Panels B and C of Table IV, we calculate MERs using base and varied 
characteristics respectively. In Panel B, we see that the marginal effects are 
consistent and significant for party identification, social group involvement and trust 
(at levels varying between 1% and 5%). Further, as seen in the previous section, the 
magnitudes are small, in contrast to the results reported in Panel C where, across all 
specifications, the magnitudes are higher, and significant at the 1% level for 
identification with the Liberal Democratic Party and the Conservative Party, 
involvement in social groups and trust.  
Panel D presents the joint marginal effects of social engagement, which are 
evaluated using the reference person characteristics and by cumulatively adding the 
effects of social engagement variables. The results show that identification with the 
Conservative Party has an 8% effect on stock market participation when other social 
engagement variables are held at their base levels. When we consider that the 
reference person also talks to neighbours, is active in social groups, trusts most 
people and believes that religion makes a difference, the joint effects are 13% for 
specification (2) and 20.6% for specification (3). In both specifications the variable 
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religion makes a difference has a negligible impact. The results are consistent with 
those reported in Table III, Panel D, and confirm that the variables active in social 
groups, trusts most people, and political party identification jointly increase the 
likelihood of stock market participation. Furthermore, considering that the mean rate 
of stock market participation is only 21%, the reported joint effects of social 
engagements are influential. Overall, the results suggest that socially engaged 
respondents are more likely to participate in the stock market with statistically and 
economically significant effects.  
4.3 The conditional marginal effects of social interaction, trust, religion 
and political party identification 
We now consider the conditional marginal effects of all of our social 
engagement measures. However, for limited dependent variable models in which 
marginal effects are calculated at means for an interaction term, the sign, 
significance and magnitude may not reflect the true relationship between variables 
(Ai and Norton 2003). In order to interpret the interaction term correctly, we calculate 
conditional marginal effects at representative values as suggested by Ai and Norton 
(2003). The marginal effects of the interaction term are then presented graphically, 
following Greene (2012).   
Figure 1 shows the marginal effects by political party identity and across age 
when we interact the variables trusts most people, active in social groups, religion 
makes a difference and political party identification. The effects and the levels of 
significance of these variables vary across party identification. For small parties, 
social group involvement is significant and positive; for the Labour party and the 
Conservative party, both social group involvement and trust are significant and 
positive; and for the Liberal Democratic Party, none of the variables are significant.  
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It is interesting to note that the effects of all the variables are insignificant 
among respondents who have no party identity, which suggests that these 
individuals are also disengaged from other social mechanisms and are thus less 
likely to invest in the stock market. This is consistent with the information gathering 
costs hypothesis of Bonaparte and Kumar (2013). For those who identify with the 
Labour party, its left-of-centre political ideology, which might in theory restrain stock 
market investment, is compensated for by trust and involvement in social groups. 
These same variables increase stock market participation for those who identify with 
the Conservative party. Religion has no impact on stock market participation for 
those who identify with both the Labour party and the right-of-centre Conservative 
party. 
4.4 The effect of a shift in political party identification  
 
In this section, we investigate transitions in political party identification and their 
impact on stock market participation. Intuitively, if political parties’ ideological and 
policy positions converge, individuals should become indifferent in their party choices 
on these grounds and instead shift political affiliation in line with perceived party 
competence, principally in economic management. Thus, transitions from one party 
to the other may be correlated with stock market participation. Our findings partially 
support this hypothesis.   
As discussed in section 2, if ‘consumer voters’ are driven by the desire to 
protect their investments, we would expect them to penalize their own parties by 
voting for another party that they believe is more competent in economic 
management. Thus, we should expect to see a positive relationship between change 
in political party identification and stock market participation if economic 
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management is a signal of pro-market policies. Alternatively, where ‘consumer 
voters’ change party preferences in reaction to policy positions taken by a political 
party, not necessarily because of their views about competence in economic 
management, then we should expect a negative association. To explore this, we 
examine shifts in political party identification. From our data, the transitional 
probabilities for political party identification reveal substantial transitions between 
political parties during the three waves. In order to capture these shifts, we generate 
a dummy variable (political party shift) that takes the value one for those who change 
parties during the three waves and zero otherwise. We find that 35% of the 
respondents changed their preferred political party during the three waves.  
We first replace political party identification with the indicator of political party 
shift in the complete model. The results in Table V, column (1) show that the variable 
has an insignificant effect on stock market participation. In column (2), we run a 
regression that includes the two variables to examine their independent effects on 
stock market participation. The negative political party shift coefficient becomes 
significant, but only at the 10% level, while the effects of political party identification 
retain the same levels of significance as seen before.  
Insert Table V Somewhere here 
In column (3) we interact the two variables using the specifications in our complete 
model. The effect of political party shift is still significant at the 10% level. The 
interaction terms are positive and significant for the Conservative Party and the 
Liberal Democratic Party and insignificant for Small Parties and the Labour Party. 
When presented graphically, in line with Greene (2012), the true marginal effects of 
the interaction between political party shift and political identity have different signs 
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to the MEMs reported in Table V. The marginal effects of political party shift differ 
across both political party identification and age. Figure 2 presents MERs using base 
characteristics while Figure 3 is derived using varied characteristics. Political party 
shift has a negative and significant effect on stock market participation among those 
who identify with the Conservative Party. In contrast, the marginal effect of political 
party shift is not significant for those who identify with the Liberal Democratic Party, 
the Labour Party and for respondents with no party affiliations. In summary, those 
who identify with the Conservative or the Liberal Democratic Party and have not 
shifted allegiance from another party (Tables IV and V) are more likely to participate 
in the stock market than an individual identifying with another party or no party. 
However, those who have recently shifted allegiance to the Conservative Party are 
less likely to participate in the stock market than those who have a longer-term 
allegiance to the Conservatives. As hypothesised in section 2.3, this suggests that 
both political party identification and consumer voting behaviour are associated with 
stock market participation.   
5. Robustness checks 
We consider alternative specifications and definitions of stock market participation to 
examine whether our results are consistent. Table VI presents marginal effects using 
the following four dependent variables: our standard definition of stock market 
participation (SMP1) with lagged SMP1 as an additional independent variable 
(column 1); the alternative stock market participation definition, SMP2 (column 2); 
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fixed income assets (column 3); and number of investment products (column 4) 
using the specifications in Table IV, column 212. 
5.1 Lagged value of Stock Market Participation 
In section 3.3 we note that transitions in (out) of the stock market are minimal, while 
most respondents tend to remain in the same state within the panel. This suggests 
that SMP1 in 2005 is likely to be influenced by participation in 2000 or 1995. To 
isolate the effects of state dependence we include a one period lag of the principal 
dependent variable as a control in Table VI, column 1. The lagged dependent 
variable enters with a value of 35% and is significant at the 1% level. Moreover, this 
specification appears to capture a lot of variation in the data as indicated by the 
pseudo r2, which increases to 27% from the 16% value reported in Table IV (Column 
2). Nevertheless, the social engagement variables – active in social group, trusts 
most people, and identification with the Liberal Democratic Party and the 
Conservative Party – remain significant at the 1% level. The variable religion makes 
a difference becomes insignificant.     
Insert Table VI Somewhere Here 
5.2 Alternative dependent variables 
Saving money in personal equity plans, Individual Savings Accounts, and other 
forms of equity investments (SMP2) provides opportunities for both portfolio 
diversification and efficient tax management. Plausibly, individuals who are more 
informed about financial market operations and are aware of changes in government 
policy are more likely to take advantage of the opportunities such knowledge 
provides. Based on our propositions regarding social interaction, trust, and party 
                                                          
12
 In columns (1) – (3) we use pooled probit regressions but in column (4) we use a Poisson regression because 
(NIP) is not a binary variable. 
32 
 
identification, we should observe increased effects on our variables of interest when 
we use this broader definition of stock market participation as the dependent 
variable. The marginal effects presented in Table VI, column 2, show that the 
variables active in social groups, trust most people, and party identification increase 
by more than 50%.  The variable religion makes a difference becomes significant at 
the 5% level. The effects of identification with smaller parties and the Labour Party 
are still lower than identification with the Liberal Democratic Party and the 
Conservative Party, but become significant at the 10% and 5% levels respectively13.   
Fixed Interest Assets (FIA) are both relatively safer and less information 
intensive than stocks, which make them attractive to less sophisticated investors as 
well as providing diversification opportunities to stock market participants. 
Characteristically, non-stock market participants in our model are less social, less 
trusting, and do not identify themselves with any political party and are therefore 
more likely to hold FIA. Thus, we should expect these factors to have a lesser, or 
negligible, effect on the decision to hold FIA. Table VI, column 3, presents marginal 
effects where the dependent variable is an indicator of ownership of Fixed Interest 
Assets (FIA) and the explanatory variables are as described in our final model. When 
compared to the results in column 2, the effect of trust declines in significance and 
the negative effect of religious beliefs increases in significance. For those who 
identify with other smaller parties the effect becomes insignificant, while for those 
who identify with the Liberal Democratic party the positive effect declines in 
significance from 1% to 5% and for the Labour Party the previously positive effect 
remains significant at the 1% level but the sign reverses. However, the effects of 
                                                          
13
 A similar pattern is observed for most of the control variables though the effects of holding other higher 
qualification, a first degree or above qualifications, and financial capability almost doubles.  
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some of the control variables change substantially. The variable has no debt 
becomes insignificant while the variable male becomes negative and is significant at 
the 1% level. The effect of the variable received windfall income is more than double 
that reported in Table IV and 50% more than that in Table VI, Column (2). 
Finally, we use the Number of Investment Products (NIP) owned by 
respondents as an alternative dependent variable. Here, our intuition is that 
individuals who are informed about financial market operations, investment products 
and government policy changes are more likely to hold a higher number of 
investment products.  In Table VI, column 4, we report marginal effects from poisson 
estimates using the specifications in our final model. The findings confirm our 
previous results: individuals who are active in social groups, trust most people, and 
identify themselves with the Liberal Democratic Party and the Conservative Party are 
more likely to hold a higher number of investment products.  Overall, our robustness 
tests confirm our conclusions derived from section 4. 
6. Conclusion 
Most previous studies report a positive association between stock market 
participation and social engagement measures when analysing each of these 
variables separately. While some recent studies consider the presence of possible 
correlations between these factors, to the best of our knowledge none carry out a 
holistic analysis. Our rich dataset enables us to address this gap. 
Using three waves in the BHPS we tackle four unresolved issues. First, 
recognising that social engagement can give rise to two distinct channels of social 
interaction, we disaggregate channels of social interaction using the categories 
talking to neighbours (strong ties) and active in social groups (weak ties). Second, 
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we test the independent effects of all of our social engagement measures in the 
same model. Third, we use an integrated measure of political party identification to 
examine the role of political identity and shifts in political party preferences. We 
disaggregate the influence of social engagement, political ideology and shifts in 
political party preferences within the same model using interaction terms. Finally, we 
calculate marginal effects at representative values for the independent and joint 
influences of social engagement.  
We conclude that weak ties are more effective and productive channels of 
social interaction than strong ties. Our measure of strong ties, frequency of talking to 
neighbours, seems only to capture the information in other social engagement and 
control variables. In addition, we show that, when modelled in isolation from other 
variables, individuals who have more weak ties, i.e. are involved in more social 
groups, are more trusting, and are members of either the Conservative or the Liberal 
Democratic parties, are more likely to participate in the stock market. Contrary to 
prior literature, religiosity has a negative effect on stock market participation. When 
estimated together in one model, the effects of strong ties remain insignificant, while 
the effects of weak ties, trust, religion and alignment to the Conservative Party or the 
Liberal Democratic Party have independent effects on stock market participation. 
When we interact our social engagement measures, for those who do not 
identify with a political party or who identify with the Liberal Democratic Party, social 
group involvement and trust have no impact on stock market participation. In 
contrast, these two variables influence stock market participation among those who 
identify with either the Labour Party or the Conservative Party, suggesting that their 
influence is independent of political ideology. Social group involvement influences 
stock market participation among those who identify with small parties. When we 
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consider shift in political affiliation, we find that those who shift to the Conservative 
Party are less likely to participate in the stock market than those who consistently 
identify with the Conservatives. The net cumulative effect of our social engagement 
measures is that the probability of stock market participation increases by 21%.   
Our study has potential policy implications. The findings suggest that policy 
makers and financial institutions wishing to enhance stock market participation 
should focus their attention on the provision of information to those who are least 
socially engaged. Of the low engagement groups, particular emphasis should be 
placed upon those who have the fewest weak ties because they are likely to have 
the least access to productive information. Given our finding that individuals who are 
more trusting are more likely to participate in the stock market, policies that enhance 
trust in stock market investments and the investment process generally are likely to 
enhance participation. This will also lower the participation cost associated with the 
cognitive dissonance experienced by those whose political or religious leanings are 
inclined against stock market participation.   
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Tables & Figures 
Table I. Variable descriptions 
Variable Description Value 
Dependent Variables 
  Stock market participation first 
definition (SMP1) 
Do you currently have any money in any of the 
investments shown? Which one? 
shares and/or unit trust = 1; other 
or none = 0 
Stock market participation 
second definition (SMP2) 
Do you currently have any money in any of the 
investments shown? Which one? 
shares, unit trusts, personal equity 
plans and TESSA/ISA =1; other or 
none = 0  
Fixed interest assets (FIA) Do you currently have any money in any of the 
investments shown? Which one? 
National savings certificate, 
premium bonds, national savings 
bonds, savings account, national 
savings bank, and other 
(investment, government or 
company security = 1 ; other or 
none = 0 
Number of investment 
products (NIP) 
Derived from the above categories Number of the above held 
Social engagement measures   
Talking to neighbours How often do you talk to any of your neighbours? Every day, once in a week, or 
once in month =1; rarely or never 
= 0 
Active in social groups Do you join in the activities of any of these organisations 
on a regular basis  
yes = 1; no = 0 
Trusts most people Generally speaking, would say that most people can be 
trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with 
people? 
most people can be trusted = 1; 
can't be too careful = 0 
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Table I. Continued 
Variable Description Value 
Religion makes a difference How much difference would you say religious beliefs 
make to your life? 
some  or a great difference = 1 ; a 
little  or no difference = 0 
Political party identification Derived variable that combines responses to four 
questions regarding: support of particular party, 
closeness to one particular party than other, party which 
would vote for tomorrow and which political party closest 
to. 
none = 1 ; Scottish National, Plaid 
Cymru, Green Party or other party 
= 2 ; Liberal Democratic = 3; 
Labour Party = 4 ; Conservative 
Party = 5 
Control variables   
Good neighbourhood Is your neighbourhood a good place to live? Good = 1; moderate or bad = 0 
Concentrated housing What type of accommodation does the household live in? Purpose built flats, converted  flat, 
or other concentrated housing = 1 ; 
Detached, semi-detached, or 
terraced = 0  
Housing  Derived variable: owned outright, owned with mortgage, 
local authority rent, housing association rented, rented 
from employer, rented private unfurnished, rented private 
furnished or other rented? 
all rented accommodation = 1; 
owned with a mortgage = 2 ; owned 
outright = 3 
Received windfall income Since Sept. 1st 1994 have you received any payments, or 
payment in kind? If answered yes, the amount received - 
life insurance, pension, personal accident claim, 
redundancy, employment bonus, inheritance/bequest, 
pools/lottery win or something else? 
yes = 1; no = 0 
Has no debt I would like to ask you now about any other financial 
commitments you may have apart from mortgages and 
housing related loans. Do you currently owe any money 
on the things listed on this card? 
yes =0; no = 1 
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Table I. Continued 
Variable Description Value 
Financial capability index  
  Saves from current 
income 
Do you save any amount of your income by putting away 
something in a bank, building society, or post office 
account other than to meet regular bills? 
yes = 1; no = 0 
Current financial 
situation 
How well would you say you yourself are managing 
financially these days: living comfortably; doing alright; 
just about getting by; finding it quite difficult; and finding it 
very difficult. 
living comfortably = 1 ;  doing 
alright = 2 ; just about getting by = 3 
; finding it quite difficult = 4 ; or 
finding it very difficult = 5  
Change in financial 
situation  
Would you say that you yourself are better off, worse off 
or about the same financially than you were a year ago? 
better off and about the same = 1 ; 
worse off = 0 
Has housing 
problems 
Many people these days are finding it difficult to keep up 
with their housing payments. In the last twelve months 
would you say you have had any difficulties paying for 
your accommodation? 
no = 1 ; yes = 0 
Problems required 
borrowing 
Did you have to borrow in order to meet housing 
payments 
no = 1 ; yes = 0 
Problems required 
cutbacks 
Did you have to cutback in order to meet housing 
payments 
no = 1 ; yes = 0 
Been at least two 
months in housing 
arrears in last 12        
months 
In the last twelve months have you ever found yourself 
more than two months behind with your rent/mortgage? 
no = 1 ; yes = 0 
Computer user  
Which item do you have? Home computer 
yes = 1; no = 0 
Health    Please think back over the last 12 months about how 
your health has been compared to people of your own 
age, would you say that your health has on the whole 
been ... 
excellent and good = 1 ; fair, poor 
or very poor =0 
Sex Interviewer checks sex of the respondent. male = 1 ; female = 0 
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Table I. Continued  
Variable Description Value 
Age Derived variable: uses date of birth variables 
on survey database. 
age at date of interview 
Marital status Married, separated, divorced, widowed or 
never married. 
married = 1 ; separated, divorced, widowed or 
never married = 0 
Has child(ren) Number of own children derived from a set 
of questions.  
  one, two, three or more kids = 1 ; none = 0 
Education Derived variable - yearly updated 
qualification of new entrants and existing 
panel members. 
no qualification = 1 ; commercial qualification, no 
o-levels, CSE grade 2-5 or Scotland grade 4-5 = 
2 ; GCE A-levels, GCE o-levels or equivalent = 
3; teaching , other higher or nursing 
qualifications = 4; and first or higher degree = 5 
Economic activity Please look at this card and tell me which 
best describes your current situation? Self-
employed, in paid employment, unemployed, 
retired, family care, FT student, long term 
sick/disabled, on maternity leave, 
government training or other. 
Unemployed, maternity leave, family care, full 
time student, sick, disabled, government training 
scheme,  or other = 1; retired = 2 ; self-
employed = 3 ; and employed = 4 
Government office region Internally computed. North East = 1; North West = 2; Yorkshire and 
Humber = 3; East Midlands = 4; West Midlands 
= 5; East of England = 6; London = 7; South 
East = 8; South West = 9; Wales = 10; Scotland 
= 11; Northern Ireland = 12; and Channel 
Islands = 13 
Income Derived variable that sums up all sources of 
income indicated by the respondent 
including : labour income and non-labour 
income. 
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Table II.  Summary statistics  
Data are derived from three waves of the BHPS: 1995, 2000 and 2005. The reported 
statistics for the whole sample are weighted and are as defined in Table I. Panel A 
presents proportion of respondents who invest directly in the stock market; invest 
through unit trust; hold individual savings accounts; have personal equity plans; invest in 
national savings bank; and invest in premium bonds. Panel B presents proportion of 
respondents who: (1) invest directly in the stock market or through unit trusts (stock 
market participation definition 1(SMP1)); (2) invest directly in the stock market, through 
unit trusts, personal equity plans, or individual savings accounts (SMP2); (3) invest in 
national savings certificate, premium bonds, national savings bonds, savings account, 
national savings bank, or other investments; and number of these products; and (4)  the 
number of these products held by a respondent (NIP). Panel C presents the fraction of 
respondents who talk to neighbours, are active in social groups, trust most people, do 
not have political party affiliation, belong to various political parties, and have shifted their 
political affiliation during the panel period. Panel D presents the proportion of 
respondents who rent, have a mortgage, or own outright their current accommodation; 
own a computer; received windfall income; have no debts; have good health, are male; 
are  married; have child(ren); hold a first degree and above, other higher, GCE level, 
lower or no qualification; and who are employed, self-employed, retired or are 
unemployed. In addition, Panel B presents average income, age, cohort, and financial 
capability index. 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Observations 
Panel A: Type of investment  
Direct shareholding 0.183 0.387 22407 
Unit trusts 0.066 0.248 22407 
Individual Savings Account 0.195 0.396 22583 
Personal Equity Plans  0.111 0.314 22583 
Savings account 0.630 0.483 14171 
National savings bank 0.048 0.214 14171 
Premium bonds 0.221 0.415 22407 
Panel B: Dependent variables 
   SMP1 0.212 0.408 22583
SMP2 0.351 0.477 22583 
Fixed interest assets (FIA) 0.280 0.449 22583 
Number of investment products (NIP) 3.951 3.464 22583 
Panel C: Social engagement measures 
   Talking to neighbours 0.928 0.259 21384
Active in social groups 0.487 0.500 22142 
Most people can be trusted 0.378 0.485 21264 
Religion makes a difference 0.434 0.496 20441 
No party affiliation 0.115 0.319 20377 
Other smaller parties 0.045 0.207 20377 
Liberal Democratic 0.137 0.344 20377 
The Labour Party 0.410 0.492 20377 
Conservative Party 0.293 0.455 20377 
Political party shift 0.381 0.486 22583 
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Table II. Continued 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Observations 
Panel D: Control variables   
Rented 0.252 0.434 22492 
Mortgaged 0.451 0.498 22492 
Outright owner 0.297 0.457 22492 
Computer user 0.480 0.500 22515 
Received windfall income 0.276 0.447 22515 
Has no debt 0.644 0.479 22507 
Financial capability index 0.003 0.582 22583 
Good health  0.684 0.465 22579 
Male 0.447 0.497 22583 
Cohort 1950 18.202 22583 
Age at date of interview 50 18.327 22583 
Married 0.582 0.493 22579 
Has child(ren) 0.270 0.444 22583 
No qualification 0.262 0.440 22337 
Lower qualification 0.088 0.283 22337 
GCE level qualification 0.269 0.443 22337 
Other higher qualification 0.262 0.440 22337 
First degree and above 0.119 0.324 22337 
Unemployed 0.178 0.383 22579 
Retired 0.258 0.438 22579 
Self employed 0.072 0.258 22579 
Employed 0.492 0.500 22579 
Income 13296 13731.4 22286 
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Table III. Social engagement and stock market participation 
The table presents marginal effects from pooled probit regressions estimates. The dependent variable in all the regressions is the 
stock market participation dummy variable. The explanatory variables are as defined in Table I. Talking to neighbours equals one if 
respondent talks to neighbours every day, once in a week, or once in a month and the value zero if rarely or never. Active in social 
groups equals one for respondents who are active and zero otherwise. Trusts most people equals one if the response is ‘most 
people can be trusted’ and zero otherwise. Religion makes a difference equals one if response is ‘some’ or ‘a great difference’ and 
zero otherwise. Number of social groups is a categorical variable equal to 1 if respondent does not belong to any social group (base 
level); equals to 2, if  respondent belongs to one number social groups; equals 3, if respondents belongs to two number social 
groups; and equals to 4, if respondent belongs to three number social groups or more. The control variables are good 
neighbourhood dummy; concentrated housing dummy; housing tenure indicators; received windfall income dummy; has no debt 
dummy; financial capability index; good health dummy; male dummy; age; age squared; cohort; married dummy; has children 
dummy; education qualification indicators; economic activity indicators; Government office region indicators; and income quintile 
indicators. Panel A presents marginal effects at means. Panel B presents marginal effects at base characteristics. Base 
characteristics represent an individual who: does not talk to neighbours; is not active in social groups; can’t be too carefu l – does 
not trust others; believes that religion makes little or no difference in life; has no political identification; rents current accommodation; 
has not received windfall income; has debt; has a financial capability index value equal to the mean; is not a computer user; has 
bad health; is a female; is not married; does not have children; has no educational qualification; is unemployed; lives in the North 
East of England; and is categorised in the 1st income quintile. Panel C presents marginal effects using varied characteristics. Unlike 
base characteristics, varied characteristics take the maximum values of each variable, apart from region, which becomes East of 
England. Panel D shows the increasing/(decreasing) joint marginal effect on stock market participation as each social engagement 
measure is included in the calculation, keeping the remaining measures at their base levels. The reference person for our 
calculation of joint marginal effects exhibits the varied characteristics previously described for Panel C above and, in addition, 
cumulatively adds the four social engagement measures, beginning with talking to neighbours. For example, in specification (5) row 
(1), we first evaluate the effect of talking to neighbours and then evaluate the marginal effects of both talking to neighbours and 
active in social groups in row (2), holding the other social engagement measures at their base levels and using the reference 
person characteristics. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level and are reported in parentheses. The levels of 
significance are given by * for 10%, ** for 5% and *** for 1%.  
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Table III. Continued 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Panel A: Marginal effects at means 
        
Talking  to neighbours -0.0001    -0.0031 -0.0056 0.0082 
 (0.0104)    (0.0107) (0.0112) (0.0132) 
Active in social groups  0.0403***   0.0405*** 0.0377***  
  (0.0051)   (0.0051) (0.0053)  
Trusts most people    0.0313***   0.0280*** 0.0284*** 
   (0.0055)   (0.0057) (0.0064) 
Religion makes a difference    -0.0193***  -0.0132** -0.0126* 
    (0.0057)  (0.0057) (0.0064) 
No of social groups 
(Base=None) 
       
One       0.0291*** 
       (0.0068) 
Two       0.0546*** 
       (0.0097) 
Three       0.0889*** 
       (0.0134) 
Good neighbourhood 0.0239*** 0.0203** 0.0203** 0.0239*** 0.0203** 0.0186** 0.0179* 
 (0.0084) (0.0085) (0.0085) (0.0089) (0.0086) (0.0090) (0.0108) 
Concentrated housing -0.0032 -0.0051 -0.0033 -0.0017 -0.0053 -0.0031 -0.0066 
 (0.0091) (0.0092) (0.0091) (0.0096) (0.0092) (0.0096) (0.0110) 
Housing Tenure 
(Base=rented) 
       
Mortgaged 0.0878*** 0.0885*** 0.0879*** 0.0948*** 0.0888*** 0.0947*** 0.0751*** 
 (0.0070) (0.0072) (0.0070) (0.0074) (0.0071) (0.0074) (0.0083) 
Outright owner 0.1615*** 0.1625*** 0.1606*** 0.1686*** 0.1627*** 0.1670*** 0.1437*** 
 (0.0083) (0.0084) (0.0083) (0.0086) (0.0084) (0.0086) (0.0096) 
Received windfall income 0.0397*** 0.0366*** 0.0400*** 0.0390*** 0.0367*** 0.0382*** 0.0399*** 
 (0.0058) (0.0058) (0.0058) (0.0061) (0.0058) (0.0061) (0.0073) 
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Table III. Continued 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Has no debt 0.0317*** 0.0324*** 0.0311*** 0.0346*** 0.0325*** 0.0344*** 0.0342*** 
 (0.0055) (0.0056) (0.0055) (0.0058) (0.0056) (0.0058) (0.0066) 
Financial capability index 0.0958*** 0.0961*** 0.0952*** 0.0988*** 0.0963*** 0.0977*** 0.0855*** 
 (0.0085) (0.0086) (0.0085) (0.0090) (0.0086) (0.0090) (0.0101) 
Computer user 0.0352*** 0.0329*** 0.0333*** 0.0368*** 0.0332*** 0.0343*** 0.0256*** 
 (0.0060) (0.0061) (0.0060) (0.0063) (0.0061) (0.0064) (0.0075) 
Good health 0.0171*** 0.0149** 0.0154*** 0.0182*** 0.0147** 0.0150** 0.0167** 
 (0.0058) (0.0059) (0.0059) (0.0061) (0.0059) (0.0061) (0.0070) 
Male 0.0166*** 0.0168*** 0.0169*** 0.0215*** 0.0169*** 0.0221*** 0.0270*** 
 (0.0061) (0.0062) (0.0061) (0.0065) (0.0062) (0.0065) (0.0070) 
Age  0.0047*** 0.0049*** 0.0045*** 0.0036*** 0.0050*** 0.0037*** 0.0049*** 
 (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0015) 
Age square -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
cohort -0.0091*** -0.0088*** -0.0087*** -0.0095*** -0.0088*** -0.0090*** -0.0068*** 
 (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) 
Married 0.0161** 0.0155** 0.0150** 0.0133** 0.0155** 0.0118* 0.0049 
 (0.0063) (0.0064) (0.0063) (0.0067) (0.0064) (0.0067) (0.0073) 
Has child(ren) -0.0216*** -0.0216*** -0.0214*** -0.0238*** -0.0212*** -0.0240*** -0.0176** 
 (0.0066) (0.0066) (0.0066) (0.0070) (0.0066) (0.0070) (0.0078) 
Education qualification 
(Base=None) 
       
Lower level 0.0486*** 0.0492*** 0.0482*** 0.0522*** 0.0489*** 0.0500*** 0.0479*** 
 (0.0100) (0.0103) (0.0101) (0.0106) (0.0103) (0.0108) (0.0120) 
GCE level  0.1023*** 0.0983*** 0.1007*** 0.1040*** 0.0981*** 0.0988*** 0.0823*** 
 (0.0077) (0.0079) (0.0078) (0.0082) (0.0079) (0.0083) (0.0090) 
Other higher  0.1179*** 0.1108*** 0.1147*** 0.1172*** 0.1107*** 0.1085*** 0.0870*** 
 (0.0081) (0.0083) (0.0082) (0.0085) (0.0083) (0.0086) (0.0093) 
First degree and 
above 
0.1737*** 0.1640*** 0.1644*** 0.1733*** 0.1636*** 0.1558*** 0.1419*** 
 (0.0112) (0.0114) (0.0113) (0.0117) (0.0114) (0.0118) (0.0130) 
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Table III. Continued 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Economic Activity 
(Base=Unemployed) 
       
Retired 0.0577*** 0.0589*** 0.0544*** 0.0613*** 0.0593*** 0.0589*** 0.0466*** 
 (0.0121) (0.0122) (0.0121) (0.0126) (0.0122) (0.0126) (0.0139) 
Self employed 0.0075 0.0087 0.0056 0.0071 0.0090 0.0071 0.0147 
 (0.0118) (0.0119) (0.0118) (0.0123) (0.0119) (0.0124) (0.0138) 
Employed -0.0019 -0.0010 -0.0037 -0.0022 -0.0005 -0.0023 0.0012 
 (0.0086) (0.0087) (0.0086) (0.0091) (0.0087) (0.0091) (0.0104) 
Region (Base=North East)        
North West 0.0499*** 0.0513*** 0.0498*** 0.0507*** 0.0511*** 0.0489*** 0.0524*** 
 (0.0175) (0.0176) (0.0175) (0.0182) (0.0177) (0.0184) (0.0199) 
Yorkshire & Humber 0.0490*** 0.0536*** 0.0509*** 0.0523*** 0.0526*** 0.0524*** 0.0413** 
 (0.0183) (0.0185) (0.0183) (0.0191) (0.0185) (0.0192) (0.0208) 
East Midlands 0.0498*** 0.0534*** 0.0507*** 0.0521*** 0.0533*** 0.0523*** 0.0575*** 
 (0.0189) (0.0190) (0.0189) (0.0197) (0.0191) (0.0199) (0.0214) 
West Midlands 0.0319* 0.0308* 0.0323* 0.0337* 0.0306* 0.0302 0.0442** 
 (0.0180) (0.0181) (0.0181) (0.0188) (0.0181) (0.0189) (0.0207) 
East of England 0.1146*** 0.1170*** 0.1146*** 0.1159*** 0.1170*** 0.1156*** 0.1186*** 
 (0.0188) (0.0189) (0.0189) (0.0197) (0.0190) (0.0198) (0.0218) 
London 0.1007*** 0.1028*** 0.1024*** 0.1070*** 0.1021*** 0.1051*** 0.1106*** 
 (0.0191) (0.0193) (0.0192) (0.0200) (0.0193) (0.0202) (0.0219) 
South East 0.0758*** 0.0779*** 0.0747*** 0.0791*** 0.0777*** 0.0764*** 0.0814*** 
 (0.0172) (0.0173) (0.0171) (0.0180) (0.0173) (0.0181) (0.0198) 
South West 0.0480*** 0.0510*** 0.0479*** 0.0524*** 0.0505*** 0.0491** 0.0596*** 
 (0.0184) (0.0186) (0.0184) (0.0193) (0.0186) (0.0194) (0.0212) 
Wales 0.0369** 0.0389** 0.0365** 0.0390** 0.0386** 0.0361** 0.0316* 
 (0.0163) (0.0164) (0.0163) (0.0170) (0.0164) (0.0172) (0.0191) 
Scotland 0.0565*** 0.0596*** 0.0548*** 0.0596*** 0.0595*** 0.0556*** 0.0581*** 
 (0.0164) (0.0165) (0.0164) (0.0171) (0.0166) (0.0173) (0.0193) 
Northern Ireland -0.0401** -0.0389** -0.0397** -0.0430** -0.0391** -0.0437** -0.0094 
 (0.0169) (0.0170) (0.0169) (0.0176) (0.0170) (0.0177) (0.0192) 
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Table III. Continued 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Income quintile (Base=1
st
 
quintile) 
       
2
nd
 .Income quintile 0.0142* 0.0164** 0.0144* 0.0148* 0.0168** 0.0166** 0.0203** 
 (0.0077) (0.0078) (0.0077) (0.0082) (0.0078) (0.0082) (0.0094) 
3
rd
 Income quintile 0.0401*** 0.0436*** 0.0405*** 0.0410*** 0.0436*** 0.0422*** 0.0355*** 
 (0.0081) (0.0082) (0.0082) (0.0086) (0.0082) (0.0086) (0.0097) 
4
th
 Income quintile 0.0690*** 0.0699*** 0.0691*** 0.0683*** 0.0700*** 0.0677*** 0.0606*** 
 (0.0090) (0.0091) (0.0090) (0.0095) (0.0091) (0.0095) (0.0106) 
5
th
 Income quintile 0.1279*** 0.1277*** 0.1261*** 0.1278*** 0.1275*** 0.1243*** 0.1092*** 
 (0.0106) (0.0107) (0.0106) (0.0111) (0.0107) (0.0110) (0.0122) 
Pseudo r
2
 0.1557 0.1575 0.1573 0.1538 0.1577 0.1576 0.1604 
Observations 25810 25246 25676 24114 25235 23916 14993 
Panel B: Marginal effects at base characteristics 
        
Talking  to neighbours -0.0000    -0.0002 -0.0004 0.0008 
 (0.0005)    (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0013) 
Active in social groups  0.0021***   0.0021*** 0.0024***  
  (0.0006)   (0.0006) (0.0007)  
Trusts most people    0.0018***   0.0019*** 0.0025** 
   (0.0006)   (0.0006) (0.0010) 
Religion makes a difference    -0.0009***  -0.0011** -0.0014* 
    (0.0004)  (0.0005) (0.0008) 
No of social groups (Base=None)        
One       0.0015** 
       (0.0006) 
Two       0.0030** 
       (0.0012) 
Three       0.0057*** 
       (0.0022) 
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Table III continued 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel C: Marginal effects at varied characteristics  
        
Talking  to neighbours -0.0002    -0.0046 -0.0081 0.0127 
 (0.0159)    (0.0159) (0.0161) (0.0209) 
Active in social groups  0.0623***   0.0625*** 0.0569***  
  (0.0081)   (0.0081) (0.0082)  
Trusts most people    0.0476***   0.0417*** 0.0438*** 
   (0.0084)   (0.0086) (0.0103) 
Religion makes a difference    -0.0290***  -0.0192** -0.0187* 
    (0.0086)  (0.0084) (0.0098) 
No of social groups (Base=None)        
One       0.0506*** 
       (0.0118) 
Two       0.0896*** 
       (0.0153) 
Three       0.1359*** 
       (0.0187) 
Observations 25810 25246 25676 24114 25235 23916 14993 
Panel D: Joint Marginal effects at means 
Talking  to neighbours     -0.0026 
(0.0090) 
-0.0045 
(0.0089) 
0.0069 
(0.0112) 
+ Active in social 
groups 
    0.0327*** 
(0.0103) 
0.0266*** 
(0.0102) 
 
+ Three or more social 
groups 
      0.0823*** 
(0.0173) 
+ Trusts most people      0.0507*** 
(0.0114) 
0.1103*** 
(0.0190) 
+ Religion makes a 
difference 
     0.0391*** 
(0.0124) 
0.0976*** 
(0.0197) 
Observations 25810 25246 25676 24114 25235 23916 14993 
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Table IV. Political party identification, social engagement and stock market 
participation 
The table presents marginal effects from pooled probit regressions estimates. Panel A 
presents marginal effects at means, Panel B marginal effects at base characteristics; 
Panel C marginal effects using varied characteristics; and Panel D joint marginal effects. 
The dependent variable in all the regressions is the stock market participation dummy 
variable. Explanatory variables are as defined in Table I. Political party identification is a 
categorical variable and is equals one if the respondent has no political affiliation (base 
level); equals two ifaffiliated with other smaller parties; equals three if affiliated with the 
Liberal Democratic Party; equals four if affiliated with the Labour Party; and equals five if 
affiliated with the Conservative Party. Talking to neighbours equals one if respondent 
talks to neighbours every day, once in a week, or once in a month and the value zero if 
rarely or never. Active in social groups equals one for respondents who are active and 
zero otherwise. Trusts most people equals one if the response is ‘most people can be 
trusted’ and zero otherwise. Religion makes a difference equals one if the response is 
‘some’ or ‘a great difference’ and zero otherwise. Number of social groups is a 
categorical variable equal to 1 if the respondent does not belong to any social group 
(base level); equal to 2, if the respondent belongs to one social group; equal to 3 if the 
respondent belongs to two social groups; and equal to 4 if the respondent belongs to 
three social groups or more. The control variables are good neighbourhood dummy; 
concentrated housing dummy; housing tenure indicators; received windfall income 
dummy; has no debt dummy; financial capability index; good health dummy; male 
dummy; age; age squared; cohort; married dummy; has children dummy; education 
qualification indicators; economic activity indicators; Government office region indicators; 
and income quintile indicators. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level and 
are reported in parentheses. The base characteristics, varied characteristics and the 
reference person are defined in the legend of Table III. The levels of significance are 
given by * for 10%, ** for 5% and *** for 1%.  
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) 
Panel A: Marginal effects at means 
Talking  to neighbours  -0.0079 0.0092 
  (0.0117) (0.0137) 
Active in social groups  0.0367***  
  (0.0055)  
Trusts most people   0.0279*** 0.0277*** 
  (0.0059) (0.0067) 
Religion makes a difference  -0.0103* -0.0100 
  (0.0060) (0.0067) 
No of social groups (Base=None)    
One   0.0295*** 
   (0.0071) 
Two   0.0531*** 
   (0.0101) 
Three or more   0.0892*** 
   (0.0137) 
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Table IV. Continued 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) 
Party identification (Base=None)    
Other smaller parties 0.0184 0.0159 0.0168 
 (0.0115) (0.0125) (0.0141) 
Liberal Democratic 0.0588*** 0.0491*** 0.0431*** 
 (0.0110) (0.0116) (0.0133) 
The Labour Party 0.0196** 0.0152 0.0105 
 (0.0089) (0.0095) (0.0112) 
Conservative Party 0.0888*** 0.0834*** 0.0803*** 
 (0.0100) (0.0106) (0.0124) 
Good neighbourhood 0.0165* 0.0111 0.0085 
 (0.0088) (0.0096) (0.0115) 
Concentrated housing 0.0004 0.0008 -0.0069 
 (0.0094) (0.0100) (0.0115) 
Housing Tenure (Base=rented)    
Mortgaged 0.0811*** 0.0884*** 0.0704*** 
 (0.0074) (0.0078) (0.0088) 
Outright owner 0.1501*** 0.1564*** 0.1355*** 
 (0.0086) (0.0090) (0.0101) 
Received windfall income 0.0361*** 0.0348*** 0.0350*** 
 (0.0061) (0.0063) (0.0075) 
Has no debt 0.0318*** 0.0333*** 0.0337*** 
 (0.0058) (0.0061) (0.0069) 
Financial capability index 0.0906*** 0.0924*** 0.0775*** 
 (0.0088) (0.0093) (0.0104) 
Computer user 0.0366*** 0.0350*** 0.0253*** 
 (0.0063) (0.0066) (0.0078) 
 Good health 0.0164*** 0.0144** 0.0157** 
 (0.0061) (0.0064) (0.0073) 
Male 0.0217*** 0.0278*** 0.0314*** 
 (0.0063) (0.0067) (0.0073) 
Age  0.0050*** 0.0043*** 0.0055*** 
 (0.0013) (0.0015) (0.0016) 
Age square -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
cohort -0.0083*** -0.0084*** -0.0063*** 
 (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0008) 
Married 0.0143** 0.0109 0.0046 
 (0.0065) (0.0069) (0.0076) 
Has child(ren) -0.0198*** -0.0220*** -0.0187** 
 (0.0069) (0.0073) (0.0082) 
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Table IV. Continued 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) 
Education qualification (Base=None)    
Lower level 0.0501*** 0.0513*** 0.0452*** 
 (0.0104) (0.0112) (0.0125) 
GCE level  0.0978*** 0.0933*** 0.0742*** 
 (0.0081) (0.0087) (0.0094) 
Other higher  0.1173*** 0.1084*** 0.0847*** 
 (0.0085) (0.0091) (0.0098) 
First degree and above 0.1687*** 0.1529*** 0.1368*** 
 (0.0116) (0.0123) (0.0136) 
Economic Activity 
(Base=Unemployed) 
   
Retired 0.0556*** 0.0581*** 0.0458*** 
 (0.0125) (0.0129) (0.0144) 
Self employed 0.0004 0.0017 0.0077 
 (0.0122) (0.0128) (0.0142) 
Employed -0.0044 -0.0038 -0.0003 
 (0.0090) (0.0095) (0.0108) 
Region (Base=North East)    
North West 0.0443** 0.0420** 0.0529** 
 (0.0184) (0.0194) (0.0207) 
Yorkshire & Humber 0.0530*** 0.0544*** 0.0480** 
 (0.0194) (0.0203) (0.0218) 
East Midlands 0.0382* 0.0400* 0.0523** 
 (0.0195) (0.0205) (0.0221) 
West Midlands 0.0241 0.0217 0.0387* 
 (0.0188) (0.0198) (0.0215) 
East of England 0.0998*** 0.1001*** 0.1071*** 
 (0.0196) (0.0207) (0.0224) 
London 0.0879*** 0.0905*** 0.1022*** 
 (0.0198) (0.0209) (0.0225) 
South East 0.0629*** 0.0639*** 0.0737*** 
 (0.0180) (0.0191) (0.0205) 
South West 0.0335* 0.0335* 0.0492** 
 (0.0191) (0.0202) (0.0218) 
Wales 0.0427** 0.0409** 0.0364* 
 (0.0172) (0.0182) (0.0200) 
Scotland 0.0643*** 0.0621*** 0.0687*** 
 (0.0174) (0.0184) (0.0204) 
Northern Ireland -0.0208 -0.0262 0.0091 
 (0.0192) (0.0203) (0.0223) 
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Table IV. Continued 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) 
Income quintile (Base=1
st
 quintile)    
2
nd
 .Income quintile 0.0133 0.0157* 0.0197** 
 (0.0082) (0.0087) (0.0098) 
3
rd
 Income quintile 0.0384*** 0.0405*** 0.0375*** 
 (0.0085) (0.0091) (0.0102) 
4
th
 Income quintile 0.0628*** 0.0614*** 0.0588*** 
 (0.0093) (0.0098) (0.0110) 
5
th
 Income quintile 0.1215*** 0.1181*** 0.1065*** 
 (0.0111) (0.0115) (0.0127) 
Pseudo r
2 
0.1614 0.1637 0.1683 
Observations 23350 21655 13708 
Panel B: Marginal effects at base characteristics   
    
Talking  to neighbours  -0.0005 0.0003 
  (0.0008) (0.0005) 
Active in social groups  0.0020***  
  (0.0007)  
Trusts most people   0.0016*** 0.0008** 
  (0.0006) (0.0004) 
Religion makes a difference  -0.0007 -0.0004 
  (0.0005) (0.0003) 
No of social groups (Base=None)    
One   0.0013** 
   (0.0006) 
Two   0.0025** 
   (0.0011) 
Three or more   0.0049** 
   (0.0021) 
Party identification (Base=None)    
Other smaller parties 0.0009 0.0012 0.0007 
 (0.0006) (0.0011) (0.0007) 
Liberal Democratic 0.0034*** 0.0044*** 0.0020** 
 (0.0011) (0.0016) (0.0010) 
The Labour Party 0.0009* 0.0012 0.0004 
 (0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0005) 
Conservative Party 0.0057*** 0.0084*** 0.0045*** 
 (0.0016) (0.0024) (0.0017) 
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Table IV. Continued 
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) 
Panel C: Marginal effects at varied characteristics   
    
Talking  to neighbours  -0.0108 0.0133 
  (0.0156) (0.0203) 
Active in social groups  0.0528***  
  (0.0083)  
Trusts most people   0.0394*** 0.0402*** 
  (0.0086) (0.0102) 
Religion makes a difference  -0.0141* -0.0139 
  (0.0082) (0.0095) 
No of social groups (Base=None)    
One   0.0496*** 
   (0.0120) 
Two   0.0843*** 
   (0.0155) 
Three or more   0.1302*** 
   (0.0187) 
Party identification (Base=None)    
Other smaller parties 0.0326 0.0268 0.0301 
 (0.0203) (0.0209) (0.0250) 
Liberal Democratic 0.0958*** 0.0771*** 0.0716*** 
 (0.0184) (0.0187) (0.0231) 
The Labour Party 0.0346** 0.0257 0.0192 
 (0.0161) (0.0164) (0.0208) 
Conservative Party 0.1364*** 0.1222*** 0.1213*** 
 (0.0169) (0.0173) (0.0219) 
Observations 23350 21655 13708 
Panel D: Joint marginal effects at varied characteristics 
    
Talking  to neighbours  -0.0078 
(0.0114) 
0.0097 
(0.0146) 
+ Active in social groups  0.0289** 
(0.0128) 
 
+ Three or more social groups    0.1003*** 
(0.0198) 
+ Trusts most people  0.0570*** 
(0.0138) 
0.1309*** 
(0.0207) 
+ Identification with the 
Conservative Party 
 0.1406*** 0.2173*** 
  (0.0171) (0.0237) 
+ Religion makes a difference  0.1299*** 
(0.0187) 
0.2063*** 
(0.0256) 
Observations  21655 13708 
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Table V. Effects of shift in political party identification 
The table presents marginal effects from pooled probit regressions estimates. The 
dependent variable in all the regressions is the stock market participation dummy 
variable. The explanatory variables are as defined in Table I. Talking to neighbours 
equals one if the respondent talks to neighbours every day, once in a week, or once in a 
month and the value zero if rarely or never. Active in social groups equals one for 
respondents who are active and zero otherwise. Trusts most people equals one if the 
response is ‘most people can be trusted’ and zero otherwise. Religion makes a 
difference equals one if response is ‘some’ or ‘a great difference’ and zero otherwise. 
Political party shift equals one if the respondent changed party affiliation during the panel 
period and zero otherwise. Political identification after the shift is a categorical variable 
equal to one if the respondent has no political affiliation (base level); equals two if 
respondent is affiliated with other smaller parties; equals three if affiliated with the Liberal 
Democratic Party; equals four if affiliated with the Labour Party; and equals five if 
affiliated with the Conservative Party. The interaction term is between political shift and 
political party identification. The control variables are good neighbourhood dummy; 
concentrated housing dummy; housing tenure indicators; received windfall income 
dummy; has no debt dummy; financial capability index; good health dummy; male 
dummy; age; age squared; cohort; married dummy; has children dummy; education 
qualification indicators; economic activity indicators; Government office region indicators; 
and income quintile indicators. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level and 
are reported in parentheses. The levels of significance are given by * for 10%, ** for 5% 
and *** for 1%.  
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) 
Talking to neighbours -0.0056 -0.0081 -0.0079 
 (0.0112) (0.0117) (0.0116) 
Active in social groups 0.0377*** 0.0367*** 0.0363*** 
 (0.0053) (0.0055) (0.0055) 
Trusts most people  0.0280*** 0.0277*** 0.0277*** 
 (0.0057) (0.0059) (0.0059) 
Religion makes a difference -0.0132** -0.0102* -0.0099* 
 (0.0057) (0.0060) (0.0060) 
Political party shift -0.0005 -0.0116* -0.0121* 
 (0.0064) (0.0067) (0.0068) 
Party identification (Base=None) 
Other smaller parties  0.0154 0.0206 
  (0.0125) (0.0131) 
Liberal Democratic  0.0486*** 0.0559*** 
  (0.0117) (0.0131) 
The Labour Party  0.0122 0.0180* 
  (0.0097) (0.0106) 
Conservative Party  0.0802*** 0.0847*** 
  (0.0107) (0.0117) 
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Table V. Continued 
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) 
Party identification * political party shift 
Other smaller parties   -0.0054 
   (0.0173) 
Liberal Democratic   0.0308** 
   (0.0149) 
The Labour Party   0.0122 
   (0.0129) 
Conservative Party   0.0569*** 
   (0.0141) 
Good neighbourhood 0.0186** 0.0107 0.0107 
 (0.0090) (0.0096) (0.0096) 
Concentrated housing -0.0031 0.0009 0.0009 
 (0.0096) (0.0100) (0.0100) 
Housing Tenure (Base=rented) 
Mortgaged 0.0947*** 0.0881*** 0.0882*** 
 (0.0074) (0.0078) (0.0078) 
Outright owner 0.1670*** 0.1560*** 0.1557*** 
 (0.0086) (0.0090) (0.0090) 
Received windfall income 0.0382*** 0.0347*** 0.0346*** 
 (0.0061) (0.0063) (0.0063) 
Has no debt 0.0345*** 0.0335*** 0.0334*** 
 (0.0058) (0.0061) (0.0061) 
Financial capability index 0.0977*** 0.0922*** 0.0923*** 
 (0.0090) (0.0093) (0.0093) 
Computer user 0.0343*** 0.0352*** 0.0349*** 
 (0.0064) (0.0066) (0.0066) 
Good health 0.0150** 0.0144** 0.0145** 
 (0.0061) (0.0064) (0.0064) 
Male 0.0221*** 0.0277*** 0.0279*** 
 (0.0065) (0.0067) (0.0067) 
Age  0.0037*** 0.0043*** 0.0043*** 
 (0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0015) 
Age square -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
cohort -0.0090*** -0.0084*** -0.0083*** 
 (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) 
Married 0.0118* 0.0110 0.0111 
 (0.0067) (0.0069) (0.0069) 
Has child(ren) -0.0240*** -0.0217*** -0.0215*** 
 (0.0070) (0.0073) (0.0073) 
Education qualification (Base=None)  
Lower level 0.0500*** 0.0514*** 0.0513*** 
 (0.0108) (0.0112) (0.0112) 
GCE level  0.0988*** 0.0933*** 0.0931*** 
 (0.0083) (0.0087) (0.0087) 
Other higher  0.1085*** 0.1084*** 0.1080*** 
 (0.0086) (0.0091) (0.0091) 
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Table V. Continued 
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) 
First degree and 
above 
0.1558*** 0.1525*** 0.1520*** 
 (0.0118) (0.0123) (0.0123) 
Economic Activity (Base=Unemployed) 
Retired 0.0589*** 0.0580*** 0.0580*** 
 (0.0126) (0.0129) (0.0129) 
Self employed 0.0071 0.0012 0.0006 
 (0.0124) (0.0128) (0.0128) 
Employed -0.0023 -0.0040 -0.0041 
 (0.0091) (0.0095) (0.0095) 
Region (Base=North East)    
North West 0.0489*** 0.0421** 0.0420** 
 (0.0184) (0.0194) (0.0194) 
Yorkshire & Humber 0.0524*** 0.0542*** 0.0545*** 
 (0.0192) (0.0204) (0.0203) 
East Midlands 0.0523*** 0.0401* 0.0399* 
 (0.0199) (0.0206) (0.0206) 
West Midlands 0.0302 0.0219 0.0218 
 (0.0189) (0.0199) (0.0199) 
East of England 0.1157*** 0.1007*** 0.0999*** 
 (0.0198) (0.0207) (0.0207) 
London 0.1051*** 0.0905*** 0.0905*** 
 (0.0202) (0.0209) (0.0209) 
South East 0.0764*** 0.0641*** 0.0637*** 
 (0.0181) (0.0191) (0.0191) 
South West 0.0491** 0.0338* 0.0336* 
 (0.0194) (0.0203) (0.0203) 
Wales 0.0361** 0.0398** 0.0401** 
 (0.0172) (0.0182) (0.0182) 
Scotland 0.0555*** 0.0612*** 0.0610*** 
 (0.0173) (0.0185) (0.0185) 
Northern Ireland -0.0438** -0.0309 -0.0329 
 (0.0178) (0.0204) (0.0215) 
Income quintile (Base=1
st
 quintile) 
2
nd
 .Income quintile 0.0166** 0.0159* 0.0159* 
 (0.0082) (0.0087) (0.0087) 
3
rd
 Income quintile 0.0422*** 0.0404*** 0.0404*** 
 (0.0086) (0.0091) (0.0091) 
4
th
 Income quintile 0.0677*** 0.0614*** 0.0613*** 
 (0.0095) (0.0098) (0.0098) 
5
th
 Income quintile 0.1243*** 0.1181*** 0.1177*** 
 (0.0110) (0.0115) (0.0115) 
Pseudo r
2 
0.1576 0.1638 0.1642 
Observations 23916 21655 21655 
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Table VI. Marginal effects with lagged and alternative dependent variables  
The table presents marginal effects from pooled probit regressions (column (1), (2), and 
(3)) and a pooled poisson regression in column (4). The dependent variables are stock 
market participation dummy (SMP1) (Column 1); dummy for the broadened definition of 
stock market participation (SMP2) (column 2); dummy for investment in fixed interest 
asset (FIA) (column 3); and number of investment products (NIP) (column 4). The 
samples consist of individuals in the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) for the 
1995, 2000 and 2005 waves. The explanatory variables are as defined in Table I. Talking 
to neighbours equals one if the respondent talks to neighbours every day, once in a 
week, or once in a month and the value zero if rarely or never. Active in social groups 
equals one for respondents who are active and zero otherwise. Trusts most people 
equals one if the response is ‘most people can be trusted’ and zero otherwise. Religion 
makes a difference equals one if response is ‘some’ or ‘a great difference’ and zero 
otherwise. Political identification is a categorical variable equal to one if the respondent 
has no political affiliation (base level); equals two if the respondent is affiliated with other 
smaller parties; equals three if affiliated with the Liberal Democratic Party; equals four if 
affiliated with the Labour Party; and equals five if affiliated with the Conservative Party. 
The control variables are good neighbourhood dummy; concentrated housing dummy; 
housing tenure indicators; received windfall income dummy; has no debt dummy; 
financial capability index; good health dummy; male dummy; age; age squared; cohort; 
married dummy; has children dummy; education qualification indicators; economic 
activity indicators; Government office region indicators; and income quintile indicators. 
Standard errors are clustered at the individual level and are reported in parentheses. The 
levels of significance are given by * for 10%, ** for 5% and *** for 1%.  
 SMP1 SMP2 FIA NIP 
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Stock market participation lagged 0.3489***    
 (0.0114)    
Talking  to neighbours 0.0101 -0.0055 0.0001 -0.0043 
 (0.0137) (0.0131) (0.0132) (0.0266) 
Active in social groups 0.0275*** 0.0447*** 0.0268*** 0.0817*** 
 (0.0068) (0.0062) (0.0065) (0.0122) 
Trusts most people  0.0212*** 0.0284*** 0.0169** 0.0554*** 
 (0.0072) (0.0066) (0.0068) (0.0134) 
Religion makes a difference -0.0048 -0.0160** -0.0197*** -0.0328*** 
 (0.0068) (0.0063) (0.0065) (0.0127) 
Party identification (Base=None) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Other smaller parties 0.0095 0.0264* 0.0206 0.0338 
 (0.0165) (0.0138) (0.0138) (0.0298) 
Liberal Democratic 0.0408*** 0.0661*** 0.0336** 0.1084*** 
 (0.0134) (0.0131) (0.0131) (0.0268) 
The Labour Party 0.0151 0.0235** -0.0233** 0.0308 
 (0.0115) (0.0107) (0.0108) (0.0226) 
Conservative Party 0.0634*** 0.0995*** 0.0581*** 0.1733*** 
 (0.0122) (0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0246) 
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Table VI. Continued 
 SMP1 SMP2 FIA NIP 
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Good neighbourhood -0.0080 0.0306*** 0.0334*** 0.0366 
 (0.0124) (0.0104) (0.0102) (0.0231) 
Concentrated housing 0.0103 -0.0066 0.0195* 0.0026 
 (0.0120) (0.0110) (0.0103) (0.0257) 
Housing Tenure (Base=rented)     
Mortgaged 0.0761*** 0.1172*** 0.0620*** 0.2144*** 
 (0.0104) (0.0097) (0.0099) (0.0173) 
Outright owner 0.1236*** 0.2260*** 0.1188*** 0.3400*** 
 (0.0117) (0.0106) (0.0106) (0.0204) 
Received windfall income 0.0176** 0.0502*** 0.0754*** 0.0726*** 
 (0.0081) (0.0072) (0.0072) (0.0129) 
Has no debt 0.0154** 0.0517*** -0.0003 0.0744*** 
 (0.0076) (0.0069) (0.0070) (0.0136) 
Financial capability index 0.0760*** 0.1386*** 0.1264*** 0.2538*** 
 (0.0118) (0.0101) (0.0075) (0.0237) 
Computer user 0.0209** 0.0363*** 0.0262*** 0.0624*** 
 (0.0084) (0.0075) (0.0076) (0.0147) 
Good health 0.0009 0.0321*** 0.0224*** 0.0237 
 (0.0080) (0.0071) (0.0072) (0.0147) 
Male 0.0136* -0.0107 -0.0476*** 0.0528*** 
 (0.0076) (0.0073) (0.0072) (0.0162) 
Age  -0.0158*** 0.0277*** 0.0260*** 0.0182*** 
 (0.0022) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0036) 
Age square -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0000 -0.0003*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
cohort -0.0242*** 0.0115*** 0.0225*** -0.0148*** 
 (0.0014) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0013) 
Married -0.0113 0.0333*** 0.0262*** 0.0104 
 (0.0082) (0.0076) (0.0077) (0.0167) 
Has child(ren) 0.0060 -0.0674*** -0.0197** -0.0174 
 (0.0090) (0.0081) (0.0081) (0.0175) 
Education qualification (Base=None) 
Lower level 0.0319** 0.0733*** 0.0578*** 0.1007*** 
 (0.0140) (0.0129) (0.0131) (0.0276) 
GCE level  0.0735*** 0.1296*** 0.0987*** 0.1976*** 
 (0.0108) (0.0102) (0.0105) (0.0203) 
Other higher  0.0732*** 0.1463*** 0.1186*** 0.2398*** 
 (0.0107) (0.0105) (0.0107) (0.0211) 
First degree and above 0.0923*** 0.2262*** 0.1674*** 0.3193*** 
 (0.0135) (0.0137) (0.0134) (0.0281) 
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Table VI. Continued 
 SMP1 SMP2 FIA NIP 
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Economic Activity 
(Base=Unemployed) 
    
Retired 0.0317* 0.0888*** 0.0714*** 0.1142*** 
 (0.0164) (0.0136) (0.0138) (0.0312) 
Self employed 0.0122 0.0421*** 0.0201 -0.0175 
 (0.0163) (0.0145) (0.0150) (0.0296) 
Employed -0.0055 0.0203* 0.0326*** -0.0319 
 (0.0124) (0.0106) (0.0105) (0.0242) 
Region (Base=North East)     
North West 0.0105 0.0501** 0.0292 0.1061** 
 (0.0188) (0.0217) (0.0199) (0.0517) 
Yorkshire & Humber 0.0403** 0.0593*** 0.0419** 0.1191** 
 (0.0196) (0.0222) (0.0205) (0.0548) 
East Midlands 0.0194 0.0232 0.0280 0.1158** 
 (0.0196) (0.0227) (0.0210) (0.0543) 
West Midlands 0.0090 0.0195 0.0339 0.0512 
 (0.0192) (0.0227) (0.0209) (0.0526) 
East of England 0.0480** 0.0770*** 0.0381* 0.2423*** 
 (0.0192) (0.0230) (0.0210) (0.0538) 
London 0.0667*** 0.0545** 0.0556*** 0.2341*** 
 (0.0206) (0.0226) (0.0207) (0.0553) 
South East 0.0394** 0.0624*** 0.0526*** 0.1465*** 
 (0.0183) (0.0212) (0.0194) (0.0499) 
South West 0.0297 0.0500** 0.0562*** 0.1043* 
 (0.0194) (0.0224) (0.0208) (0.0537) 
Wales 0.0142 0.0490** 0.0135 0.0141 
 (0.0183) (0.0203) (0.0187) (0.0470) 
Scotland 0.0292 0.0537*** 0.0392** 0.0600 
 (0.0183) (0.0204) (0.0186) (0.0480) 
Northern Ireland  -0.0955*** -0.2029*** -0.1808*** 
  (0.0225) (0.0223) (0.0465) 
Income quintile (Base=1
st
 
quintile) 
    
2
nd
 .Income quintile -0.0016 0.0284*** 0.0190* 0.0261 
 (0.0123) (0.0102) (0.0105) (0.0186) 
3
rd
 Income quintile 0.0126 0.0597*** 0.0427*** 0.0928*** 
 (0.0122) (0.0107) (0.0109) (0.0198) 
4
th
 Income quintile 0.0267** 0.0963*** 0.0594*** 0.1288*** 
 (0.0127) (0.0115) (0.0118) (0.0212) 
5
th
 Income quintile 0.0700*** 0.1562*** 0.0855*** 0.2335*** 
 (0.0140) (0.0130) (0.0129) (0.0254) 
Pseudo r
2 
0.2665 0.2017 0.1358 0.1723 
Observations 11111 21655 21655 21655 
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Figure 1. Conditional marginal effects with social engagement interaction terms 
The figure displays the conditional marginal effects derived from a pooled probit 
regression using the specifications in Table IV, Column 2 and interaction terms for the 
variables active in social groups, trusts most people, and religion makes a difference. 
The marginal effects are calculated using varied characteristics as defined in the legend 
to Table III. Other variables are evaluated at their average values: age square, cohort 
and financial capability. The plotted marginal effects for the variable active in social 
group are significant at the 5% level for identification with the Labour Party and at the 
10% level for identification with the Conservative Party and Small Parties, among 
individuals aged below the age of 86. For the variable trusts most people, the plotted 
marginal effects are significant at the 1% level for identification with the Labour Party and 
at the 5% level for identification with the Conservative party, among respondents aged 
76 and below, and at 5% and 10% respectively among respondents above age 76. 
Religion is not significant.   
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Figure 2. Conditional marginal effects of shift in political preferences – base 
characteristics 
The figure displays the conditional marginal effects derived from a pooled probit 
regression using the specifications in Table IV, Column 4 and an interaction term 
between the variables political party shift and political party identification after the shift. 
The marginal effects are evaluated  at base characteristics (see Table III legend) for 
each variable, apart from age square, cohort, and financial capability that take average 
values. The marginal effects are significant at the 10% level for identification with the 
Conservative Party among individuals aged between 46 and 86. 
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Figure 3. Conditional marginal effects of shift in political preferences – varied 
representative values 
The figure displays the conditional marginal effects of a shift in political identity. The 
marginal effects are evaluated using varied characteristics as defined in the legend to 
Table III. Other variables are evaluated at their average values: age square, cohort and 
financial capability. For identification with the Conservative Party, the plotted marginal 
effects are significant at the 5% level among individuals aged 76 or below and at the 
10% level for those aged above 76. 
